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ABSTRACT: Successful innovations could induce more disclosure if the information asymmetry between the firm and
its investors about post-innovation outcomes leads investors to demand more information. However, such innovations
also likely entail greater proprietary cost concerns, which deter disclosure. This paper uses patent grants to examine
the effect of innovation success on management guidance behavior. We find that more management guidance follows
patent grants, suggesting that despite disclosure cost concerns, firms with successful innovations do respond to
information demand. This association is stronger after enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure and for firms with
greater institutional investor ownership, further highlighting the role of information demand. The association is weaker
for firms with more competition, consistent with proprietary cost concerns having a moderating impact. Overall, our
findings suggest that innovation creates demand for more voluntary disclosure, and firms’ disclosure decisions
following innovation outcomes vary in ways that disclosure theory and economic intuition predict.
JEL Classifications: G30; G32; G38; M41; M48.
Data Availability: All data are available from the public sources identified in the paper.
Keywords: innovation; patents; voluntary disclosure; management forecasts.
Although innovation can enable a company to achieve higher profit margins, the very newness of innovative products
makes demand for them unpredictable. In addition, their life cycle is short—usually just a few months—because as
imitators erode the competitive advantage that innovative products enjoy, companies are forced to introduce a steady stream
of new innovations. The short life cycles and the greater variety typical of these products further increase unpredictability.
—Fisher (1997, 106)
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nnovation is an important driver of a firm’s long-term growth and competitiveness (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994;
Klepper 1996). In the modern era, patents serve as an important measure of innovation success, and firms that generate
more patents are widely regarded as more innovative (Acs, Anselin, and Varga 2002). However, estimating the future
earnings impact of patent grants is difficult because their commercial potential is often hard to determine. These difficulties are
exacerbated by the quickening pace of innovation, which leads to a shorter product life cycle, greater competition based on
innovation, and increased patent litigations (Fisher 1997; Bessen and Meurer 2006). This problem is further compounded by
the fact that to bring an innovation to fruition, a firm likely incurs further near-term expenses, such as those in developing or
licensing related patents (Shapiro 2001; Farrell and Klemperer 2007). Hence, capital market participants are likely to demand
more forward-looking financial information from innovative firms, such as expected earnings.
Disclosure theory predicts that when there is information asymmetry and uncertainty about firm value among investors,
managers have greater incentives to make more voluntary disclosures (Verrecchia 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001). Studies find
that the stock market appears to ignore past successes when valuing future innovations, and a long-short portfolio strategy that
takes advantage of the information in past track records generates significant abnormal returns annually (Cohen, Diether, and
Malloy 2013; Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li 2013). According to the ‘‘expectations adjustment’’ hypothesis put forth by Ajinkya and
Gift (1984), managers disclose earnings forecasts to align investors’ expectations of future earnings with those of
management.1 However, the desire to reduce information asymmetry between the firm and its investors is tempered by
concerns about the costs and risks of disclosure. For instance, even though obtaining a patent reduces the likelihood that an
innovation will be ‘‘stolen’’ by competitors, it remains possible for competitors to disregard the legal implications and adopt the
innovation for their own use, especially if voluntary disclosure reveals the patent’s potential and the firm’s intent to further
develop and capitalize on it.
In this paper, we focus on patent grants as an indicator of innovation success. Patenting—an important milestone in the
innovation process—has two important features. First, it is a right granted by a country to the owner of an invention that
prevents others from making, using, importing, or selling the invention without permission. Second, invention owners must
provide detailed public disclosure of the invention being patented. In the U.S., this disclosure is facilitated by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the federal agency responsible for granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks.
Disclosure is likely to stimulate greater interest in a patent’s future financial outcome. To capture a firm’s innovation success,
we measure the number of patents and citations to proxy for the quantity and quality, respectively, of the firm’s innovation.
Our main results reveal that innovation success, in terms of both the quantity and quality of the patents granted, is followed
by more management guidance. Our results are robust to controlling for an array of firm-, CEO-, and board-level
characteristics, and to including firm (or industry), year, and CEO fixed effects. We also conduct an instrumental variable
regression and find similar results. The collective weight of these tests is indicative of a causal relationship between successful
innovation and subsequent voluntary disclosure.
In cross-sectional tests, we find the positive link between innovation and management forecasts to be especially strong in
settings where investor demand for voluntary disclosure is high. Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) curtailed private
communications with selected parties and enhanced demand for public disclosure (e.g., Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong 2003;
Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang 2003; Hutton 2005; Wang 2007). Consistent with our conjecture, our main finding is
incrementally stronger in the post-Reg FD period. Our main results are stronger for firms with more institutional investors,
consistent with prior literature indicating that institutional investors are in a better position to demand and elicit voluntary
disclosure from management (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Bushee and Noe 2000; Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005).
We next examine how competition affects firms’ willingness to provide more disclosure following innovation success. As
competition exacerbates proprietary cost concerns, we expect firms under greater competition to be less forthcoming with
earnings guidance. We capture competition using industry concentration following Hoberg and Phillips (2016). Confirming our
expectation, we find the positive relationship between patent grants and management guidance to be weaker for firms facing
more competition.
In motivating our primary hypothesis, we argue that innovation success creates information asymmetry between firms and
their shareholders, and predict that firms respond by issuing more management forecasts. To support this argument, we
document that following a patent grant, there is a short-term increase in information asymmetry. In other words, more
management forecasts in the wake of innovation success might be attributed to managers responding to increased information
asymmetry. This heightened information asymmetry appears to recede following the provision of management forecasts.
1 For a survey of this literature, see Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008).
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Our paper contributes to both the literature on innovation and that on corporate disclosure. While many extant papers in the
innovation literature examine the determinants of firm-level innovation (e.g., Hsu, Tian, and Xu 2014; Tian and Wang 2014;
Chen, Huang, and Lao 2015), very few consider its consequences. Among those that do, Bena and Li (2014) show that firm
innovation is an important driver of business acquisitions. Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) find a positive association
between intangible assets and analyst coverage. They argue that the presence of intangible assets exacerbates information
asymmetry between managers and shareholders, thus creating profitable opportunities for private information acquisition for
information intermediaries. Jones (2007) examines the research and development (R&D) disclosures of a small sample of
highly R&D-intensive firms. However, recent literature highlights several shortcomings of R&D expenditure as a measure of
innovation success (Koh and Reeb 2015). Hence, our paper complements Barth et al. (2001) and Jones (2007) by using a large
sample to study a common and important form of voluntary corporate disclosure—management forecasts. With this sample, we
are able to conduct several additional analyses that shed light on the conditions under which innovation success leads to more
voluntary disclosure.
We also contribute to the literature on corporate disclosure, particularly on management forecast antecedents (e.g., Healy
and Palepu 2001; Hirst et al. 2008). The prior literature argues that the tendency to issue management forecasts increases with
investors’ information demand (e.g., Coller and Yohn 1997; Li and Zhuang 2012; Kim, Shroff, Vyas, and Wittenberg-
Moerman 2018); it decreases with higher disclosure costs, such as proprietary costs (e.g., Verrecchia 1983; Darrough and
Stoughton 1990; Wang 2007). Our paper complements this stream of the literature by studying how product market
development in the form of innovation success affects management forecasts. One unique aspect of our setting is that in the
presence of innovation, both information demand and proprietary costs are high. Whether and how managers alter their
disclosure behavior in such settings is less clear. Hence, our paper contributes to the management forecast literature by
documenting how the benefits and costs of disclosure can together shape management guidance decisions. In doing so, we
answer Hirst et al.’s (2008) call to advance the literature by examining management forecasting behavior when more than one
potentially competing forecast antecedents are in play.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We develop our hypotheses in Section II, and present the sample and
empirical design in Section III. Section IV discusses the results of the main tests. In Section V, we present additional analyses
and robustness tests. Section VI concludes.
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The extant literature suggests that innovation is a crucial driver of long-term economic growth (Solow 1957; Romer 1990).
A large body of literature investigates the factors that stimulate firm-level innovation. For example, studies show that
innovation is affected by both internal and external financial constraints (Cornaggia, Mao, Tian, and Wolfe 2015; Himmelberg
and Petersen 1994), stock market liquidity (Fang, Tian, and Tice 2014), ownership structure (Aghion, Van Reenen, and
Zingales 2013), and financial development (Hsu et al. 2014). However, less is known about how innovation outcomes affect
firms’ disclosure behavior.
Innovation activities can potentially increase the information asymmetry between a firm and its investors because it is
difficult for investors to predict future revenue and expenses from attempts to monetize the innovation. As investors become
aware of the outcomes of a firm’s innovation activities, such as patent grants, they grow keen to discover how these outcomes
affect the firm’s financial performance in both the long and short terms. While the revenue impact of such activities likely takes
time to realize, the costs pertaining to further developing and commercializing innovation outcomes are incurred much earlier.
Moreover, the firm’s short-term financial outlook is an important piece of information in determining whether the firm is on a
sufficiently stable footing to fully realize the potential benefits of its innovations.
Nevertheless, estimating how innovation activities affect firms’ future earnings is a complex issue. For instance, barring a
few exceptions, U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require all internal R&D costs to be expensed as
incurred. However, the cost of acquiring a patent and any legal costs associated with filing and defending it can be capitalized.
Patent litigation, on the rise in recent years, also adds to the uncertainty of the expenses and revenue streams. In addition to the
gains and losses directly related to court awards arising from patent ligation, these lawsuits can result in injunctions that affect
the continuing sales of existing products that rely on the patents or future sales of new products. Furthermore, innovation
outcomes could lead to companies entering into complex arrangements that can result in special revenue recognition issues. For
example, such arrangements may involve multiple elements, such as the licensing of intellectual property, R&D services,
manufacturing services, and commercialization activities, each of which may require separate accounting.
Accounting numbers should reflect the economic substance of a firm’s business and earnings and, therefore, are especially
important as summary measures of business performance. Relatedly, management guidance is an important form of voluntary
disclosure that helps to manage investor expectations about the firm’s future performance (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Kasznik and
Do Innovative Firms Communicate More? Evidence from the Relation between Patenting and Management Guidance 275
The Accounting Review
Volume 96, Number 1, 2021
Lev 1995; Matsumoto 2002). Therefore, we focus on how innovation outcomes (measured within the context of patent grants)
affect firms’ earnings guidance behavior.
Innovation and the Provision of Management Guidance
Management forecasts are an increasingly common tool for managers to voluntarily communicate their private information
to capital market participants and other stakeholders. Disclosure theory generally predicts that managers have incentives to
guide market participants when information asymmetry between the firm and its investors leaves the latter uncertain about the
firm’s value and, therefore, hungry for information (Verrecchia 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001). Many studies document the
benefits of providing earnings guidance (e.g., Coller and Yohn 1997; Li and Zhuang 2012; Goodman, Neamtiu, Shroff, and
White 2014).
However, the tendency to guide market participants is weakened by the potential costs of doing so. These can vary from
the direct cost of disclosure to indirect costs, such as proprietary costs, which arise from passing valuable proprietary
information to existing and potential competitors (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010).2 Moreover, managers may choose
not to issue management guidance, either because of uncertainty about how investors will respond to the disclosure or due to
reputation concerns that stem from making forecasts that might eventually prove inaccurate (Waymire 1985; Skinner and Sloan
2002; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Suijs 2007). Hence, managers are expected to trade off these benefits and costs in
determining whether to provide earnings guidance.
Both the demand for and the costs associated with management guidance are likely higher following successful innovation
activities. Information demand is likely higher due to greater information asymmetry and uncertainty about financial
performance and firm value. Greater information asymmetry arises because successful innovations may affect firms’ operating
outcomes and competitive strategies. Relatedly, greater uncertainty about financial performance and firm value arises from the
difficulty in predicting whether and to what extent innovations can generate future cash flows for the firm. Moreover, earnings
guidance, by increasing firms’ visibility, allows them (and their managers) to signal that they are financially astute and careful
in evaluating their innovations’ potential impact on the bottom line.
In addition, having certain successful innovations may not immediately result in near-term profits. More investment
might be needed, such as internal development, acquisition, and/or licensing to develop products and services that would
generate future cash flows for the firm. These activities may require more resource commitments that can affect near-term
profitability and give managers an incentive to guide the market toward more achievable short-term profit numbers,
avoiding, for example, the torpedo effect (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Matsumoto 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002).
Further, stakeholders would also be keen to find out about short-term profitability in order to assess the firm’s capability of
carrying out its future plans.
Nevertheless, innovative firms might also find it costlier to release management guidance for several reasons. Even after
a patent grant, innovative outcomes in general—and the profitability of the resultant products and services in particular—are
uncertain by nature. This inherent uncertainty creates difficulty in forecasting earnings following an innovation. For
example, Waymire (1985) argues and finds empirical support to suggest that the managers of firms with more volatile
earnings are less likely to provide earnings forecasts due to the potential repercussions associated with missing projections.
Similarly, Graham et al. (2005) report survey results showing that a major factor discouraging voluntary disclosure is
reputation concerns that stem from creating market expectations that may ultimately go unmet. Moreover, management
guidance can provide competitors with supplementary information that enables them to gauge a firm’s assessment of demand
projections, the additional resource commitments required, the effect on the firm’s current product line-ups, etc.
Accordingly, the proprietary costs associated with management guidance could be particularly high in the wake of a
successful innovation (Wang 2007).
Hence, whether a firm would provide more or less management guidance following a successful innovation is an empirical
question. Accordingly, we form our main hypothesis in the null form, as follows:
H1: There is no association between firms’ innovation output and the provision of management guidance.
Next, we present a number of additional hypotheses aimed at gaining a further understanding of the relationship between
innovation and management guidance. Moreover, obtaining additional results consistent with the theoretical predictions would
further strengthen the inferences made from the tests of our primary hypothesis.
2 To an extent, patents provide legal protection that can reduce the proprietary costs of disclosing patent-related information. However, financial
disclosures—combined with other market intelligence—could still reveal proprietary information about firms’ plans to commercialize the patents
granted and the projected financial outcomes of doing so.
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Investors’ Information Demand
As H1 states, the cost-benefit trade-off of voluntary disclosure for innovative firms is not immediately clear. While investor
demand could prompt managers to issue management guidance, proprietary cost concerns could dissuade them from doing so.
Investigating this trade-off forms the basis of our second and third hypotheses.
We examine two contexts in which investors are especially likely to seek more information from innovative firms: (1)
following enactment of Reg FD, which curtails private communications; and (2) when the fraction of institutional investors is
large.
Regulation Fair Disclosure
Private communications are a natural substitute for public disclosure (e.g., Hutton 2005; Wang 2007) and are likely to be
particularly useful when the firm engages in significant innovation activities. However, if private disclosure channels are
curtailed, then the higher information demand associated with innovation activities can only be met via public channels. The
passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in the year 2000 is a significant event in this respect because it prohibits private
communications with selected parties, such as institutional investors and preferred financial analysts. Consistent with the notion
of restrictions on private communications resulting in more public disclosure, Bailey et al. (2003) and Heflin et al. (2003) find
that issuance of management guidance increases post-Reg FD. Accordingly, we expect the incremental demand for public
disclosure following innovation activities to be higher in the post-Reg FD period. Therefore, we hypothesize in alternative
form:
H2a: The association between firms’ innovation output and the provision of management guidance (if any) is more
positive after the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure.
Institutional Investors
Prior research suggests that institutional investors are more likely to both demand and elicit more voluntary disclosure from
a firm. For example, Healy et al. (1999) report that increases in firms’ institutional ownership follow increases in their
disclosure ratings. More directly related to our study, Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that firms with greater institutional ownership
are more likely to issue management earnings forecasts. Accordingly, we argue that the demand for management forecasts from
innovative firms is particularly high when the firms have high institutional ownership. Accordingly, we posit in alternative
form:
H2b: The association between firms’ innovation output and the provision of management guidance (if any) is more
positive for firms with greater institutional ownership.
Competition
The potential proprietary costs associated with revealing information to competitors often discourages management from
issuing earnings guidance (Verrecchia 1983; Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Wang 2007). Even though patent protection can
mitigate concerns about competitors producing identical or nearly identical duplicates (Darrough 1993; Scotchmer 1991;
Bessen and Meurer 2006; Glaeser 2018; Glaeser and Landsman 2019), patents do not provide absolute protection against rivals
developing competing products and technologies. While patent information is already in the public domain, public
management forecasts would be of particular concern to innovative firms facing higher competition. By combining patent
information with management forecasts, competitors could gauge the product market potential of a firm’s innovative outcomes,
determine its plans and resource commitments, and then then craft counterstrategies that put the firm at a disadvantage. In
contrast, innovation-driven proprietary cost concerns that stem from management guidance would be much lower for firms with
less competition. Accordingly, such firms are more likely to issue management forecasts compared to innovative firms facing
high competition. We formalize this argument in our next hypothesis, in alternative form:
H3: The association between firms’ innovation output and the provision of management guidance (if any) is more
negative for firms facing higher competition.
III. SAMPLE AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN
We obtain guidance data from the I/B/E/S database. Our sample period starts in 1995 because, although I/B/E/S guidance
data are available from the end of 1992, the initial years of coverage are less comprehensive. We focus on quarterly
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management guidance and consider all types of forecasts (i.e., point, range, and qualitative guidance). We are interested in the
provision of voluntary disclosure per se, and each piece of guidance, regardless of its nature, can be useful in updating
investors’ beliefs about the firm’s future earnings. Our primary dependent variable is the number of guidance forecasts issued in
a fiscal year (Guidance).
We obtain the patent records of all firms from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database.3 We
use firm-level patent data as an output-based measure of innovation (Kamien and Schwartz 1975; Griliches 1990; Hirshleifer et
al. 2013; Hsu et al. 2014). The key advantage to using such a measure is that it more closely captures firms’ success in
innovation than an input-based measure such as R&D expenditure (Griliches 1990; Trajtenberg 1990).4 Using the NBER
database, we construct two metrics of innovation output: patent count (LogPatentCount) and patent citations (LogPatentCite).
LogPatentCount captures the number of patents granted to a firm in a fiscal year and LogPatentCite does the same for the total
number of citations received for such patents. LogPatentCount can be viewed as a measure of the quantity of successful
innovation output and LogPatentCite as a measure of quality. Because we examine management guidance behavior following
patent grants, the patent data used in this paper start in 1994. While this database ends in 2006, we only use patent data up to
2004 due to concerns about truncation bias in the data, which prior literature highlights. We focus on the year of the patent
grant, rather than the patent application, because of our interest in whether successful innovation output affects firms’ earnings
guidance behavior. Moreover, because not all patent applications are granted, focusing on the application year could generate
look-ahead bias.5 Following the literature, we use the logarithmic value of 1 plus the patent or citation count to mitigate
skewness in firm-level patents and citations.
The sample construction process is tabulated in Panel A of Table 1. Panel B displays the number of observations by year.
While the sample size is somewhat lower in the last three years, this reduction is consistent with the overall decline in the
number of listed firms.6 Panel C presents the sample distribution by industry and, for each industry, the average patent count
and average number of citations.
We examine the impact of innovation on the issuance of management guidance with the following regression
specification:
Guidancei;tþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1Innovationi;t þ b2LagGuidancei;t þ b3R&Di;t þ b4LogSizei;t þ b5Book-to-Marketi;t þ b6ROAi;t
þ b7Lossi;t þ b8MeanReturni;t þ b9RetVoli;t þ b10Leveragei;t þ b11NumBizSegi;t þ b12Financingi;t
þ b13KSi;t þ b14Spreadi;t þ b15Amihudi;t þ b16ShrTurnoveri;t þ b17InstOwni;t þ b18ERCi;t
þ b19Analysti;t þ Firm FEi þ Year FEt þ ei;t:
ð1Þ
where i and t indicate firm and year, respectively. The dependent variable, Guidance, is the number of quarterly forecasts
issued in the year following a patent grant. The variable of interest, Innovation, is measured by either LogPatentCount or
LogPatentCite. We employ a lead-lag structure for the dependent variable and the variable of interest because we examine
management guidance behavior following successful patent outcomes. However, because guidance activity tends to be
sticky, reverse causality is a concern. We overcome this issue by including the guidance for year t (LagGuidance) as a
control variable, which effectively ensures that we capture the change in guidance behavior following successful
innovations.
Our regression model also controls for a number of other firm-level characteristics that could affect managers’
decision to issue guidance. We control for R&D expenditure (R&D) to ensure that the documented effect of innovation
success on management guidance is incremental to that, if any, of R&D spending (Koh and Reeb 2015). We control for
the effects of firm size through the natural logarithm of total assets (LogSize) because prior literature suggests that larger
firms are more likely to issue management forecasts (Kasznik and Lev 1995). To control for investment opportunities and
growth options, we include the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity—Book-to-Market (Bamber
and Cheon 1998; Call, Chen, Miao, and Tong 2014). We control for firm profitability through the return on assets (ROA)
and include the indicator variable Loss to denote whether the firm made a loss, as prior literature finds that loss-making
firms are less likely to issue management forecasts (Ajinkya et al. 2005). We also control for the average and standard
deviation of the monthly stock returns during the year (MeanReturn and RetVol) because extant research suggests that
firms with more difficult-to-predict earnings are less likely to issue management guidance (Waymire 1985; Ajinkya et al.
3 See: https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home
4 For example, Koh and Reeb (2015) show that 10 percent of firms with missing R&D values actually file and receive patents, suggesting that output-
based measures are better at capturing firms’ innovative activities.
5 We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this issue.
6 See: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?end¼2004&locations¼US&start¼1994&view¼chart
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2005). Because financing structure and complexity could be related to innovation activities and disclosure decisions, we
control for financial leverage (Leverage) and the number of business segments (NumBizSeg).
Further, we follow Lang and Lundholm (2000) and control for financing needs as the sum of net equity and net debt issues
(Financing), as both innovation and management forecasts could be associated with financing needs. We use the measure
developed by Kim and Skinner (2012) to control for firms’ ex ante litigation risk (LitigationRisk).7 In addition, we control for
liquidity in terms of the bid-ask spread (Spread), the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (Amihud), and the monthly share
turnover (ShrTurnover). Because institutional investors’ information demands could be greater than those of individual
investors, we control for the institutional ownership percentage (InstOwn). We control for firms’ earnings response coefficient
to capture the importance of earnings in valuations (ERC). We also control for analyst coverage (Analyst), as Barth et al. (2001)
find analyst coverage to be positively associated with intangible assets, and investment in such assets could influence
innovation. Complete definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix A.
We employ firm and year fixed effects to account for time-invariant firm characteristics and time trends, respectively.
Employing firm fixed effects ensures greater statistical rigor because significant results (if any) can be more closely
attributed to within-firm variations in patent grants. As additional tests, we also examine an alternative model in which
firm fixed effects are replaced with industry fixed effects (SIC two-digit level). We cluster standard errors at the firm
level.
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for our main variables of interest and control variables. The average frequency of
management guidance (Guidance) is 1.57. Note that the number of patents granted (LogPatentCount) and the number of patent
citations (LogPatentCite) are defined as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the respective raw number. The numbers reported in
Table 2 translate to a mean annual patent count of 1.0 and an average of 3.1 citations.
TABLE 1
Sample Description
Panel A: Sample Construction
Firm-year observations from NBER patent datasets from 1994 to 2004 61,200
Firm-year observations from I/B/E/S datasets from 1995 to 2005 18,611
Firm-year observations from Compustat from 1994 to 2004 79,511
Less: Observations in the financial and utilities industries (16,992)
Compustat merged with I/B/E/S guidance and NBER patent datasets 62,519
Observations with missing control variables (37,624)
Final sample 24,895













(continued on next page)
7 Our results are not sensitive to controlling for ex post litigation risk in period tþ1.
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IV. RESULTS
Main Results (H1)
The results for model (1) are reported in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2), respectively, report the results with LogPatentCount
and LogPatentCite as the measures of innovation output. In columns (3) and (4), firm fixed effects are replaced by industry
fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level.8 In Table 3, column (1), the coefficient on LogPatentCount is positive and significant
(coefficient size ¼ 0.28, t-statistic ¼ 5.32). The coefficient on LogPatentCite in column (2) of Table 3 is also positive
(coefficient size¼ 0.05, t-statistic¼ 2.66). Together, these results suggest an increase in the provision of management guidance
following successful innovation output. They are consistent with the idea that the perceived benefits of reducing information
TABLE 1 (continued)













01 Agricultural Production—Crops 3.02 39.80 37 Transportation Equipment 41.40 555.44
02 Agricultural Production—Livestock 0.13 0.65 38 Instruments and Related Products 14.73 234.14
07 Agricultural Services 0.07 0.67 39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 5.33 108.06
08 Forestry 0.00 0.00 50 Wholesale Trade—Durable Goods 0.55 8.75
10 Metal, Mining 0.16 1.51 51 Wholesale Trade—Nondurable Goods 0.84 6.34
12 Coal Mining 0.00 0.00 52 Building Materials and Gardening Supplies 0.38 2.08
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 1.61 41.28 53 General Merchandise Stores 0.06 1.02
14 Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 2.57 56.84 54 Food Stores 0.01 0.08
15 General Building Contractors 0.04 1.14 55 Automotive Dealers and Service Stations 0.01 0.96
16 Heavy Construction, Except Building 6.70 112.92 56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 0.04 0.36
17 Special Trade Contractors 0.05 0.34 57 Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 0.22 2.52
20 Food and Kindred Products 2.57 24.74 58 Eating and Drinking Places 0.02 0.05
21 Tobacco Products 1.83 57.73 59 Miscellaneous Retail 0.21 8.59
22 Textile Mill Products 2.12 10.38 70 Hotels and Other Lodging Places 0.00 0.00
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products 0.09 0.77 72 Personal Services 0.04 0.74
24 Lumber and Wood Products 2.25 24.24 73 Business Services 10.44 226.16
25 Furniture and Fixtures 6.53 104.99 75 Auto Repair, Services, and Parking 0.36 4.96
26 Paper and Allied Products 19.14 363.22 76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 0.67 11.93
27 Printing and Publishing 0.96 14.68 78 Motion Pictures 1.02 18.58
28 Chemical and Allied Products 17.26 188.54 79 Amusement and Recreation Services 0.65 18.70
29 Petroleum and Coal Products 15.61 202.02 80 Health Services 0.15 5.32
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 6.61 66.23 81 Legal Services 0.00 0.00
31 Leather and Leather Products 0.40 5.06 82 Educational Services 0.02 0.65
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 5.83 67.00 83 Social Services 0.00 0.00
33 Primary Metal Industries 3.16 39.14 86 Membership Organizations 1.00 21.13
34 Fabricated Metal Products 4.58 62.34 87 Engineering and Management Services 1.25 25.38
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 30.11 637.61 99 Non-Classifiable Establishments 232.78 2261.05
36 Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 34.37 709.80 Unclassified
Industrya
— 0.10 1.64
a This category contains all the firms within our sample with a missing industry classification in Compustat.
The sample spans the period from 1994 to 2004, with the year being the year patents are granted. Note that for our research design, patents granted in year t
are matched to guidance announced in year tþ1. We exclude the financial and utility industries (SIC 4000–4999 and 6000–6999). Panel A shows the
sample construction process, and Panel B gives a breakdown of the number of observations by year. Panel C shows a breakdown of the number of
observations by industry (at the SIC two-digit level) and their average patent activities during our sample period.
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
8 There are slightly fewer observations with industry fixed effects because industry codes are missing for some firms. As a robustness check, we create an
‘‘unclassified industry’’ category for observations without industry codes, so that those with missing codes can be included. None of our results are
sensitive to the decision to either include or exclude these observations.
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asymmetry by projecting future earnings in light of a successful innovation outcome outweigh the associated disclosure costs.
In terms of economic magnitude, we observe that a one-standard-deviation increase in LogPatentCount (LogPatentCite)
increases the number of management forecasts in the subsequent period by 22.1 percent (7.3 percent) relative to its mean.9 For
the control variables, the coefficient on LagGuidance is positive, revealing the highly persistent nature of management
forecasts. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that firms that are likely to provide more guidance are larger, less likely to
incur losses, and have higher and more stable returns. We also find that litigation concerns discourage, whereas stock illiquidity
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75
Guidance 24,895 1.57 3.84 0.00 0.00 1.00
LagGuidance 24,895 1.13 2.86 0.00 0.00 1.00
LogPatentCount 24,895 0.69 1.24 0.00 0.00 1.10
LogPatentCite 24,895 1.41 2.30 0.00 0.00 2.92
R&D 24,895 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.07
LogSize 24,895 5.90 1.76 4.61 5.75 6.99
Book-to-Market 24,895 0.54 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.70
ROA 24,895 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.04 0.08
Loss 24,895 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00
MeanReturn 24,895 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04
RetVol 24,895 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.19
Leverage 24,895 0.20 0.19 0.02 0.17 0.32
NumBizSeg 24,895 3.90 3.91 1.00 3.00 5.00
Financing 24,895 0.09 0.46 0.02 0.00 0.05
LitigationRisk 24,895 7.03 2.43 5.44 6.50 8.00
Spread 24,895 1.82 1.75 0.52 1.34 2.54
Amihud 24,895 0.50 1.48 0.00 0.03 0.23
ShrTurnover 24,895 7.10 6.83 2.59 4.83 9.05
InstOwn 24,895 0.34 0.30 0.00 0.32 0.60
ERC 24,895 14.19 66.45 2.39 2.63 19.23
Analyst 24,895 6.44 6.37 2.00 4.00 9.00
FutureFinancing 24,281 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.04
CEOComp 9,735 7.76 1.08 7.02 7.69 8.44
CEOTenure 9,735 7.24 7.18 2.00 5.00 10.00
CEOEquityComp 9,735 0.44 0.29 0.20 0.45 0.67
LogDelta 9,735 0.81 1.44 0.13 0.76 1.70
LogVega 9,735 0.83 2.64 1.68 0.76 0.21
BoardSize 3,867 9.26 2.54 7.00 9.00 11.00
PctIndDirector 3,867 0.81 0.10 0.75 0.83 0.89
CEOChair 3,867 0.79 0.41 1.00 1.00 1.00
PctFemDirector 3,867 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.14
PatentAttorney 24,842 2.23 2.49 0.50 1.15 3.13
IndusLogPatentCount 24,895 0.49 0.44 0.10 0.33 0.85
IndusLogPatentCite 24,895 1.00 0.82 0.21 0.69 1.82
HHI 20,476 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
InstOwn50 24,895 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
RegFD 24,895 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for our main variables of interest, as well as for the control variables. The sample spans the period from 1994 to
2004, with the year being the year patents are granted. Note that for our research design, patents granted in year t are matched to guidance announced in
year tþ1. We exclude the financial and utility industries (SIC 4000–4999 and 6000–6999).
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
9 For LogPatentCount, the coefficient ¼ 0.28, s.d. ¼ 1.24. Mean value of Guidance ¼ 1.57. Hence, the impact ¼ 0.28  1.24/1.57 ¼ 22.1 percent.
Following the same process, the impact of LogPatentCite ¼ 0.05  2.30/1.57 ¼ 7.3 percent.
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TABLE 3
Relation between Firm Innovation and Management Guidance





LagGuidance 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.90*** 0.90***
(27.10) (27.18) (43.58) (43.55)
R&D 0.23 0.15 0.07 0.09
(0.52) (0.34) (0.34) (0.47)
LogSize 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.02 0.02
(3.82) (4.06) (0.84) (0.91)
Book-to-Market 0.06 0.05 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.86) (0.79) (4.49) (4.45)
ROA 0.25 0.22 0.23** 0.23**
(1.30) (1.15) (2.00) (1.99)
Loss 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.09* 0.09*
(2.73) (2.60) (1.70) (1.74)
MeanReturn 3.50*** 3.44*** 3.46*** 3.46***
(6.43) (6.34) (7.84) (7.85)
RetVol 2.32*** 2.31*** 0.92*** 0.93***
(6.68) (6.65) (3.43) (3.49)
Leverage 0.55** 0.59*** 0.02 0.03
(2.49) (2.66) (0.22) (0.31)
NumBizSeg 0.00 0.00 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.18) (0.20) (2.87) (2.80)
Financing 0.06 0.06* 0.05 0.05
(1.52) (1.65) (1.63) (1.64)
LitigationRisk 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.03***
(4.00) (4.04) (2.77) (2.79)
Spread 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(11.18) (11.28) (11.64) (11.74)
Amihud 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.01
(3.55) (3.60) (0.71) (0.83)
ShrTurnover 0.00 0.00 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.40) (0.47) (8.49) (8.44)
InstOwn 0.22 0.23 0.29*** 0.28***
(1.16) (1.24) (4.13) (4.02)
ERC 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00*
(0.86) (0.77) (1.96) (1.94)
Analyst 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(5.27) (5.38) (7.00) (7.06)
Observations 24,895 24,895 23,608 23,608
Adj. R2 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes No No
Industry FE No No Yes Yes
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Table 3 presents the results of regressions that examine the relation between firm innovation and management guidance. The first (last) two columns
present the results with year fixed effects and firm fixed effects (industry fixed effects). Constants are included, but not reported for any of the regressions.
t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported below the coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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promotes, management guidance. Management guidance is also positively associated with analyst following, consistent with
firms responding to analysts’ information demand.
We also note that the coefficient on the control variable R&D in Table 3 is insignificant. As discussed previously, our focus
is on the successful outcomes of innovation activities as captured by patent grants, as opposed to input measures that could
potentially influence innovation. The insignificant coefficient on R&D is also in line with the findings of Koh and Reeb (2015)
that R&D disclosures are rather unreliable due to both subjective and complex R&D expense allocation decisions and
managers’ conscious efforts to obfuscate R&D expenditure. In contrast, once granted, managers have no influence whatsoever
over the disclosure of patents by the USPTO. Unrelated to the issue of construct validity surrounding R&D disclosures, it is
also possible that management is more inclined to issue forecasts after a patent grant because the outcome risk and proprietary
costs associated with an already-obtained patent are lower than they are for R&D investments in general.
Addressing Further Concerns about Omitted Correlated Variables and Endogeneity
A major concern for an empirical study of this nature is endogeneity induced by reverse causality and/or omitted correlated
variables. As previously discussed, the inclusion of lagged guidance as a control variable and firm fixed effects should alleviate
these concerns to some extent. Nonetheless, to lend greater support to our inferences, we conduct a number of robustness tests.
Potential Unobservable Differences between Firms with and without Patents
To address the concern that the positive relationship between patenting and management forecasts may be driven by other
unobservable systematic differences between firms or industries that do and do not hold patents, we rerun our main analyses
excluding (1) firms that obtained no patents during our sample period, (2) firm-year observations with no patent grants, (3)
industries with zero patents, and (4) industry-years with no patenting activities. The results are tabulated in Panel A of Table 4.
We continue to find a positive association between our innovation proxies and management forecasts.
Additional Control Variables
While our main regression model controls for a number of firm-level characteristics, in this section, we augment this model
by incorporating alternative proxies for financing needs and controlling for several CEO- and board-level characteristics. The
results are presented in Panel B of Table 4. In columns (1) and (2), we conduct our main analyses again by controlling for
financing needs in the following, instead of the current, fiscal year to address the concern that future financing needs may affect
managers’ incentives to provide guidance.10 In columns (3) and (4), we supplement firm and year fixed effects with CEO fixed
effects to ensure that our results are not sensitive to the CEO’s reporting preferences. We obtain CEO information from
Execucomp, which results in a drop in our sample size. In columns (5) and (6), we further rule out CEO incentives as a
potential confounding factor by controlling for CEO compensation (CEOComp), tenure (CEOTenure), the percentage of equity
the CEO holds (CEOEquityComp), and the CEO’s incentive, measured by the portfolio delta (LogDelta) and vega (LogVega).
In columns (7) and (8), we also include the following board characteristics to control for governance: board size (BoardSize),
the percentage of independent directors on the board (PctIndDirector), CEO-chairman duality (CEOChair), and the percentage
of female directors (PctFemDirector). Despite significant sample size shrinkage, the coefficients on LogPatentCount and
LogPatentCite continue to remain positive and significant in all columns in Panel B.
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Tests
Next, we further rule out endogeneity concerns by conducting 2SLS tests using instrumental variables. While it is
extremely difficult to find instruments that meet both the relevance and exclusion restriction conditions, we come up with two
instruments based on economic intuition and prior literature.
Our first instrument is the presence of patent attorneys (and agents) in the state where a firm’s headquarters is located.
Patent attorneys add value to the preparation of a patent application due to their experience with previous applications, and by
helping the inventor recognize all of an invention’s novel aspects. Furthermore, patent attorneys are likely to be methodical
about following and meeting Patent Office due dates, reducing frictions in the patent filing and granting process. They would
also be involved in any patent litigation. Consequently, they are more likely to be concentrated in states where there is more
demand for patent-related services. Simply stated, it is intuitive to expect firms headquartered in a state with many patent
attorneys to have a higher level of patenting activity. But while the presence of patent attorneys is likely indicative of such
activity, it is difficult to imagine this labor market condition as having a direct effect on firms’ management guidance. It is
10 Our inference remains unchanged when we control for financing needs at tþ1 and tþ2 and at t and tþ1.
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TABLE 4
Addressing Endogeneity Concerns
Panel A: Excluding Firms and Industries with Zero Patents













LogPatentCount 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.27***
(4.30) (3.61) (5.30) (5.19)
LogPatentCite 0.06*** 0.11** 0.05*** 0.05***
(3.19) (2.23) (2.69) (2.65)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,237 11,724 8,388 7,806 24,694 24,694 23,278 22,951
Adj. R2 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.60
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Regressions with Additional Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LogPatentCount 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.53**
(5.25) (2.99) (3.65) (2.52)
LogPatentCite 0.05*** 0.06* 0.08** 0.18**
(2.63) (1.72) (2.49) (2.15)
Financing 0.16 0.18* 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.01
(1.58) (1.78) (0.85) (1.01) (0.03) (0.03)
FutureFinancing 0.05 0.05
(0.61) (0.65)
CEOComp 0.24** 0.24** 0.48*** 0.48***
(2.24) (2.22) (3.77) (3.77)
CEOTenure 0.01 0.01 0.05* 0.05*
(1.02) (1.08) (1.75) (1.73)
CEOEquityComp 0.53** 0.53** 1.33*** 1.34***
(2.38) (2.37) (3.27) (3.28)
LogDelta 0.11 0.12 0.35* 0.35*
(1.46) (1.50) (1.87) (1.85)
LogVega 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02









Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,281 24,281 11,117 11,117 9,735 9,735 3,867 3,867
Adj. R2 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.67
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO FE No No Yes Yes No No No No
(continued on next page)
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conceivable that other factors could also influence the concentration of patent attorneys. For example, it is reasonable to expect
them to have a greater presence in jurisdictions where more patent lawsuits are heard. However, to the extent that these other
determinants are not directly associated with management forecasting behavior, our instrument continues to remain valid.
Accordingly, we obtain information on registered patent attorneys (and agents) from the USPTO website and construct the
variable, PatentAttorney, by counting the number of patent attorneys within each state.11
As the second instrument, we follow an approach commonly employed in the accounting literature: using the industry
average of the variable of interest. Accordingly, we construct the industry average LogPatentCount and LogPatentCite at the
two-digit SIC level and label them IndusLogPatentCount and IndusLogPatentCite (Hsu, Lee, Liu, and Zhang 2015). This
approach should fulfill the instrument validity conditions because the extent of patent activities likely varies at the industry
level. While industry factors could also affect disclosure practices, there is no ex ante reason to believe that the underlying
determinants of the latter are directly associated with the former. In other words, while industry membership could affect
disclosure, there is no compelling reason to believe that industries with high (low) patent activity are also those with a high
(low) level of disclosure. Having a second instrument also allows us to test over-identification restrictions to discern whether
the exclusion restriction condition is violated.
The results for the 2SLS specifications are reported in Panel C of Table 4.12 In the first-stage regressions, we observe that
the instrumental variable is positive and significantly associated with the relevant patent activity. Moreover, in the second-stage
TABLE 4 (continued)



















Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,962 23,962 23,962 23,962
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value of Sargan-Hansen test — 0.10 — 0.28
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Table 4 presents the results of additional analyses aimed at addressing endogeneity concerns. Panel A presents the results of regressions that address
potential fundamental differences between innovative and non-innovative firms and industries. Columns (1) and (2) (columns (5) and (6)) present the
results excluding firms (industries) with zero patents. Columns (3) and (4) (columns (7) and (8)) show results excluding firm-years (industry-years) with
zero patents. Panel B presents the results using additional control variables. The first two columns show the results using future financing needs as the
control variable instead of financing needs in the current year. Columns (3) and (4) present the results after including CEO fixed effects. Columns (5) and
(6) show regression results after including the CEO-related control variables. The last two columns present the results after including control variables
related to the CEO and those related to the board of directors. Panel C presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. Both the number of patent
attorneys in the state where the firm is headquartered and the industry average innovation are employed as instruments for firm innovation. Columns (1)
and (3) of Panel C report the first-stage results, while columns (2) and (4) report the second-stage results. Constants are included, but not reported. While
we also include the control variables in Table 3, their coefficients are not reported. t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported below the coefficient estimates
and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.
The definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix A.
11 We obtain patent lawyer information from the following source: https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/
12 For parsimony, we report the results with two instrumental variables in each first-stage regression. Our 2SLS results are robust to the inclusion of each
instrument variable individually. Specifically, we find a significant positive association between innovation and guidance when we add the instrumental
variables one at a time.
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regressions, we find that the instrumented constructs of LogPatentCount and LogPatentCite are again positive and significant,
confirming the main findings in Table 3. Further, the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen tests are insignificant, suggesting that over-
identification is unlikely to be a problem.
Effect of Investors’ Information Demand (H2)
H2 argues that the association between patent grants and management forecasts is more positive when investors are more
likely to demand voluntary disclosures from management. Accordingly, H2a and H2b posit that the relationship between
innovation output and management forecasts is more positive following the passage of Reg FD and in the presence of more
institutional investors, respectively.
To examine the Reg FD effect, we amend model (1) by including the indicator variable RegFD and its interactions with
LogPatentCount and LogPatentCite. RegFD takes the value of 1 for the years after the regulation’s enactment (i.e., 2001 and
after), and 0 otherwise. H2a predicts positive coefficients on LogPatentCount  RegFD and LogPatentCite  RegFD. The
results for the tests of H2a are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, Panel A. As expected, the coefficients on both the
interaction terms LogPatentCount  RegFD and LogPatentCite  RegFD are positive and significant. These results suggest that,
as hypothesized in H2a, management forecasting behavior following successful innovation outcomes is particularly high after
the adoption of Reg FD.
H2b argues that firms with a higher level of institutional investor ownership are more likely to provide greater disclosure
following a successful innovation outcome. We examine this prediction by augmenting model (1) with the variable InstOwn50
and its interaction term with LogPatentCount and LogPatentCite. InstOwn50 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if
institutional investors collectively hold over 50 percent of outstanding shares, and 0 otherwise.13 The coefficients of interest are
those on the interaction terms LogPatentCount  InstOwn50 and LogPatentCite  InstOwn50, which we predict will be
positive. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5, Panel A report the results. The coefficients on the interaction terms are significantly
positive, as predicted.14
Together, the results presented in Table 5, Panel A support our argument that the relationship between innovation and
management forecasts is more positive when investor demand for voluntary disclosure is higher.
Effect of Competition (H3)
H3 argues that innovative firms facing greater competition are less likely to issue management guidance because of the
higher proprietary costs of voluntary disclosure. We capture competition in terms of industry concentration (HHI), following
Hoberg and Phillips (2016), who identify firms’ competitors based on 10-K product descriptions. We consider this construct
to be especially relevant in our setting because product similarity is likely to be a key determinant of the extent to which a
competitor might benefit from increased disclosure following a successful innovation. In investigating H3, we extend model
(1) by incorporating HHI and its interaction term with LogPatentCount and LogPatentCite. Note that HHI is an inverse
proxy of competition. Accordingly, H3 predicts positive coefficients on the interaction terms LogPatentCount  HHI and
LogPatentCite  HHI.
The results, reported in Table 5, Panel B, are consistent with our predictions; the coefficients on both LogPatentCount 
HHI and LogPatentCite  HHI are significantly positive. These results indicate that firms with greater competition are less
inclined to provide management guidance following a patent grant.
V. ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
In this section, we report the results of several robustness tests and additional analyses.
Long-Term versus Short-Term Forecasts
The revenue impact of patent grants likely occurs over the long-term. However, patent grants can also increase demand for
short-term forecasts because any costs related to further improvements and the patents’ commercialization are usually incurred
and recognized over the short term. Moreover, it could be argued that short-term forecasts are also useful in assessing firms’
13 This set of data is obtained from the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings database. We use 50 percent as the cut-off because institutional
investors are likely to have a greater influence on a firm’s disclosure policy when they collectively hold the majority of shares outstanding.
14 We also observe that the coefficients on InstOwn50 are either statistically insignificant or marginally negative. One interpretation of these results is that
for non-innovative firms with no information demands stemming from innovation success, high institutional ownership is not significantly associated
with voluntary disclosure. In some cases, high institutional ownership might even curtail voluntary disclosure because institutional investors might be
privy to private information that they might not want publicly disclosed.
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TABLE 5
Effect of Information Demand and Competition
Panel A: Effect of Information Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LogPatentCount  RegFD 0.36***
(7.05)
LogPatentCite  RegFD 0.22***
(8.08)
LogPatentCount  InstOwn50 0.24***
(4.08)










Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,895 24,895 24,895 24,895
Adj. R2 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.60
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Effect of Competition
(1) (2)
LogPatentCount  HHI 0.14**
(2.13)










Adj. R2 0.60 0.60
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Table 5 presents the results of regressions that examine the effect of investors’ information demand. Columns (1) and (2) show the impact of Regulation
Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on the relation between firm innovation and management guidance. Columns (3) and (4) present the results regarding the impact
of majority institutional holdings on the association between innovation and guidance. Constants are included, but not reported. While we also include the
control variables in Table 3, their coefficients are not reported. t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported below the coefficient estimates and are based on
robust standard errors clustered by firm.
The definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix A.
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financial stability and their ability to fully exploit the long-term opportunities afforded by patent grants. Based on this
reasoning, our main analyses consider all quarterly management forecasts, irrespective of whether they pertain to the next
quarter or a longer period.
As an additional analysis, we investigate whether our results are sensitive to the distinction between short- and long-term
forecasts. Accordingly, we rerun model (1) by replacing the dependent variable Guidance with either short-term (STGuidance)
or long-term guidance (LTGuidance), along with the respective lag variables. We define STGuidance as the number of
quarterly forecasts for the current fiscal quarter and LTGuidance as the number of quarterly forecasts for quarters beyond the
current fiscal quarter.
The results are reported in Table 6. Columns (1) and (2) (columns (3) and (4)) report the respective results with
LogPatentCount and LogPatentCite as the variables of interest and STGuidance (LTGuidance) as the dependent variable. As
can be seen from the table, the coefficients on both LogPatentCount and LogPatentCite are reliably positive regardless of the
dependent variable. In other words, these results reveal that patent grants are followed by increases in both short- and long-term
management guidance behavior.
Additional Robustness Tests
We conduct an array of further robustness tests. First, we investigate whether our results hold with respect to the propensity
to issue management guidance. In untabulated tests, we amend model (1) by replacing the dependent variable Guidance with
Guider, which takes the value of 1 if the firm makes at least one quarterly management forecast during the year, and 0
otherwise. Our inferences remain unchanged. Second, we reexamine our primary hypothesis using Poisson regressions. In
untabulated results, we continue to find the coefficients on LogPatentCount and LogPatentCite to be positive in all but one
specification, indicating that, by and large, our main inferences are not sensitive to the regression approach employed.15 Third,
we address potential sampling bias in the management guidance data. Following the recommendations of Chuk, Matsumoto,
and Miller (2013), we reexamine our primary hypothesis for subsamples of firms with a large analyst following, firms with high
institutional ownership (based on the respective yearly medians), and profitable firms. We observe that the coefficients on both
LogPatentCount and LogPatentCite are positive for all three subsamples of firms that are less likely to suffer from incomplete
guidance data. Hence, our inferences do not appear to be affected by management guidance data coverage.
TABLE 6
Short- versus Long-Term Guidance










Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,895 24,895 24,895 24,895
Adj. R2 0.36 0.36 0.61 0.60
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Table 6 presents the results of regressions that examine the relation between firm innovation and short- and long-term management guidance. Constants are
included, but not reported in all regressions. t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported below the coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors
clustered by firm.
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
15 The only exception is the coefficient on LogPatentCount in the firm fixed effect regression, which remains positive, but is statistically insignificant.
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Last, we address potential look-ahead bias in LogPatentCite. The LogPatentCite variable captures citations that are
obtained subsequent to the patent grant. To the extent that patents with more citations are likely to be more profitable, the look-
ahead nature of the LogPatentCite measure raises the concern that increases in the number of management forecasts may be
induced by the prospect of higher future profits, rather than by innovation per se. Obtaining consistent results with
LogPatentCount, which is immune to look-ahead bias, assuages this concern to a great degree. However, to further rule it out,
in untabulated tests, we rerun our regressions after including additional controls for future profitability over different horizons
(ROAtþ1, ROAtþ2, and ROAtþ3). These inclusions do not alter any of our inferences.
Increased Management Forecasts and Changes in Information Asymmetry
Next, we investigate whether increased management forecast activity following a patent grant is associated with any
discernible change in information asymmetry in the equity market. This investigation is based on the notion that investors
demand information to reduce information asymmetry, either among themselves (e.g., between informed and uninformed
investors) or between themselves and the firm. An extensive body of theoretical and empirical literature on disclosure
documents that disclosure reduces both types of information asymmetry in equity markets (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991;
Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007, 2012; Li and Zhuang 2012; Goodman et al. 2014). Hence, we expect information
asymmetry to be lower for innovative firms that provide voluntary disclosure.
To investigate this conjecture, we construct two measures of information asymmetry. First, to capture the information
asymmetry between more and less informed investors, we use the Amihud (2002) stock illiquidity measure (Amihud), which
captures the price impact of trades. This illiquidity measure is widely used in the finance literature because it is easy to construct
and is based on Kyle’s (1985) seminal market microstructure model. We calculate Amihud as the average daily absolute return
scaled by the dollar trading volume in a fiscal year. Second, to capture the information asymmetry between a firm and its
investors, we argue that greater information asymmetry between the firm and outside investors is characterized by the
comparative lack of precision with respect to information about the firm (Lambert et al. 2007, 2012). As a result, there would be
greater uncertainty about firm value and higher return volatility (e.g., Ross 1989; Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk 2009).
Hence, we construct the measure, LogRetVol, by taking the natural logarithm of the average daily return volatility in a fiscal
year.
With the above two measures, we examine the impact of guidance following a patent grant on information asymmetry
using the following regression specification:
InfoAsyi;tþ2 ¼ b0 þ b1Guidancei;tþ1  Innovationi;t þ b2Guidancei;tþ1 þ b3Innovationi;t þ b4LagInfoAsyi;tþ1 þ b5Sizei;tþ1
þ b6LogShrTurni;tþ1 þ b7Lossi;tþ1 þ b8InstOwni;tþ1 þ b9LogAnaFoli;tþ1 þ Firm FEþ Year FEþ ei;t:
ð2Þ
where i and t indicate firm and fiscal year, respectively. InfoAsy refers to Amihud and LogRetVol. Innovation is measured by the
natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of patent grants (LogPatentCount) or the natural logarithm of 1 plus the patent citations
in a fiscal year (LogPatentCite). Guidance is measured using the number of quarterly forecasts the firm provides during the
fiscal year. We assume the following timeline: a firm receives a patent grant in period t; its manager provides guidance in
period tþ1; and information asymmetry effects become apparent in period tþ2.
We include a set of control variables based on the prior empirical literature that examines the determinants of information
asymmetry. Following Fu, Kraft, and Zhang (2012), Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004), and Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Neamtiu
(2011), we add the following control variables: LogSize, LogShrTurn, Loss, InstOwn, and LogAnalyst. LogSize is the natural
logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the year. LogShrTurn is the natural logarithm of the average daily trading
volume divided by shares outstanding in a fiscal year. Loss is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the net income before
extraordinary items is negative, and 0 otherwise. InstOwn is the average percentage of shares held by institutional investors
within the fiscal year. LogAnalyst is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the analyst following measured in the last month of a fiscal
year. We also control for one-year-lagged measures of stock illiquidity (LagAmihud) and return volatility (LagRetVol), so that
we essentially capture changes in stock liquidity and return volatility, respectively, for firms that issue more guidance following
innovation success.
The results of the regressions examining the information asymmetry outcomes of innovative firms that provide guidance
are reported in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) document the results with Amihud as the dependent variable. The coefficients on
the interaction terms LogPatentCount  Guidance and LogPatentCite  Guidance in columns (1) and (2), respectively, are
negative. This result suggests that when managers of innovative firms provide guidance, information asymmetry is lowered
among investors in these firms. This inference is consistent with the prior literature documenting reduced information
asymmetry when firms respond to investors’ information demand by providing public disclosure, which tends to benefit less
informed investors more. Columns (3) and (4) present the results with LogRetVol as the dependent variable. The respective
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coefficients on LogPatentCount  Guidance and LogPatentCite  Guidance are negative, again indicating that investors benefit
from reduced information uncertainty when innovative firms provide voluntary disclosure.
In sum, the results reported in Table 7 suggest that management guidance by innovative firms reduces information
asymmetry in the equity market.
Innovation Success and Changes in Information Asymmetry
Our primary argument for innovative firms increasing disclosure is that these firms respond to greater investor demand for
information after innovation success. The results reported in this section indicate that issuing management forecasts after patent
grants reduces information asymmetry and investor uncertainty in the long term. A related question is whether information
asymmetry and, thus, information demand increase immediately after patent grants.
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017) examine the equity market effects of innovative firms in the short
window after a patent grant announcement. In particular, they find that trading activity increases significantly in the days
following an announcement. They also find that the returns on patent grant days are more volatile than they are on days with no
patent grant announcement. These findings suggest that patent grants increase investor interest, divergence of opinion, and/or
TABLE 7
The Effect of Providing Guidance after Innovation Success on Information Asymmetry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amihud LogRetVol
LogPatentCount  Guidance 0.002** 0.001***
(2.06) (3.34)










Guidance 0.001 0.001 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.17) (0.48) (3.96) (4.04)
LogSize 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.050*** 0.050***
(10.44) (10.44) (13.01) (13.01)
LogShrTurn 0.555*** 0.554*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(14.65) (14.65) (33.50) (33.53)
Loss 0.259*** 0.258*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(6.35) (6.33) (17.72) (17.70)
InstOwn 0.469*** 0.467*** 0.041*** 0.041***
(5.83) (5.79) (2.68) (2.68)
LogAnalyst 0.029 0.028 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.91) (0.89) (3.50) (3.52)
Observations 23,895 23,895 23,895 23,895
Adj. R2 0.71 0.71 0.82 0.82
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Table 7 presents the results of regressions that examine the effect on information asymmetry in the capital market for firms that provide guidance after
innovation success. The first two columns present the results with stock illiquidity (Amihud) to proxy for information asymmetry among investors, whereas
the next two columns use return volatility (LogRetVol) to proxy for information asymmetry between the firm and its investors. Constants are included, but
not reported for any of the regressions. t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported below the coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors
clustered by firm.
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
290 Huang, Ng, Ranasinghe, and Zhang
The Accounting Review
Volume 96, Number 1, 2021
information asymmetry in the equity markets, which, in turn, stimulates trading (Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Kandel and
Pearson 1995; Bamber, Barron, and Stober 1999). Kogan et al. (2017) also find that the positive market reaction at the time of
the announcement is positively associated with future firm growth, suggesting that, on average, investors rationally expect the
firm to build on its innovation success.
To complement Kogan et al. (2017), we examine whether stock illiquidity and return volatility increase after the patent
grants in our sample, which would provide within-sample evidence of a short-term increase in investors’ information
asymmetry in the wake of a patent grant. Similar to the previous section, we consider two forms of information asymmetry: (1)
among investors, and (2) between the firm and its investors (or simply investor uncertainty).
To examine immediate changes in information asymmetry following patent grants, we use the sample of firms with patent
grants and examine the short-term change in information asymmetry before and after the grant in the short window.
Specifically, we use an event-study approach to examine the stock illiquidity and return volatility in the three-day window after
a patent grant date [t1, tþ1] relative to the three-day window before the grant date [t4, t2] using the following specification:
STInfoAsyi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Posti;t þ b2Sizei;t þ b3LogShrTurni;t þ b4Lossi;t þ b5InstOwni;t þ b6LogAnaFoli;t þ Firm FE
þ ei;t
ð3Þ
where i and t indicate firm and patent grant date, respectively. Note that a firm can have multiple patent grant dates within a
year, and we examine the short-term market reaction at each grant date.16 STInfoAsy refers to STAmihud and STLogRetVol,
where STAmihud is the average daily absolute return scaled by the dollar trading volume over the three-day window, and
STLogRetVol is the natural logarithm of the average daily return volatility over the three-day window. We regress these
dependent variables on the indicator variable Post, which takes the value of 1 (0) for the window after (before) a patent grant.
As in model (2), we control for the following variables, measured in the fiscal year before the patent grant date: LogSize,
LogShrTurn, Loss, InstOwn, and LogAnalyst. If a firm’s information demand increases in the short-term following a patent
grant, we would expect a simultaneous increase in stock illiquidity and return volatility, signaled by a positive coefficient on
Post.
We present the results in Table 8. Column (1) shows the results using STAmihud as the proxy for information asymmetry.
The coefficient on Post is positive and significant, indicating an increase in illiquidity immediately following a patent grant.
Column (2) presents the results with STLogRetVol as the dependent variable. Similar to the results in the first column, the
coefficient on Post is positive, indicating greater investor uncertainty. These results offer evidence that firms’ information
asymmetry increases immediately following a patent grant. This, in turn, suggests that our primary finding that management
issues more forecasts following innovation success can be attributed to managers’ attempts to mitigate heightened information
asymmetry and to respond to investors’ information demands.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine whether innovation success, measured in terms of patent grants, induces firms to make more
voluntary management forecasts. Following a successful innovation, investor demand for voluntary disclosure is expected to
increase because investors would be keen to learn about the innovation’s short- and long-term financial implications. But
disclosure is also expected to come with high proprietary costs. Our results indicate that management forecasting behavior
increases following a patent grant, suggesting that, on average, and at least in our context, the benefits of additional disclosure
are perceived to outweigh the costs. We attempt to provide a causal interpretation of our results through several econometric
approaches that include controlling for contemporaneous management forecasting behavior, employing firm fixed effects, and
applying 2SLS regressions with instrumental variables.
Having established that innovation induces firms to provide more management guidance, we conduct cross-sectional
analyses that examine how investors’ information demand and managers’ disclosure cost concerns impact the relationship
between patent grants and guidance. We document a stronger positive association between patent grants and management
forecasts following enactment of Reg FD and for firms with higher institutional ownership. These outcomes are suggestive of
innovative firms responding to investors’ information demands. We also find that firms with greater competition are less likely
to increase management forecast issuance following a patent grant, indicating that proprietary costs of disclosure remain an
important issue.
Our findings hold with respect to both short- and long-term forecasts and when we replace the number of guidance
forecasts released with the propensity to release such forecasts. We also conduct several other robustness tests to ensure that our
16 Within our sample of patent grant dates, the three-day event windows do not contain overlapping patent grants for any firm.
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findings are not sensitive to our regression specification choices and potential sample biases. We further find evidence
suggestive of reduced information asymmetry for firms that disclose more information in the wake of innovation success.
Finally, we directly examine the premise that uncertainty increases in a firm’s information environment following innovation
success and find evidence consistent with this maintained assumption.
It is important to note that we capture a firm’s innovation success in terms of patent grants, which are accorded certain legal
protections. While a patent grant is a stronger measure of innovation success than input-based measures, such as R&D
expenditure (e.g., Griliches 1990; Trajtenberg 1990; Koh and Reeb 2015), one may expect the relation between patent activity
and voluntary disclosure to vary with the level of legal protection or enforcement, which, in turn, may depend on country- or
industry-level institutional factors. Future research may address some of these questions.
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Amihud Average daily absolute return divided by the daily dollar trading volume in a fiscal year, multiplied by
1,000,000.
Analyst Number of analysts following the firm, measured in the last month of a fiscal year.
BoardSize Number of directors on the board.
Book-to-Market Ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year.
CEOChair Indicator variable equaling 1 if the CEO is also the board chair.
CEOComp Natural logarithm of the CEO’s total compensation for a given year, including salary, bonus, other annual
compensation, long-term incentive payouts, other cash payouts, and the value of restricted stock and stock
option awards.
CEOTenure Years of the CEO’s tenure until the current fiscal year.
CEOEquityComp Percentage of the CEO’s total compensation that is equity compensation.
ERC The earnings response coefficient is the stock market reaction (the change in stock price) to one unit of
unexpected earnings, where unexpected earnings are measured as the difference between the reported
earnings per share and the most recent I/B/E/S consensus forecast.
Financing Sum of net equity issues and net debt issues. Net equity issues are calculated as the sale of common and
preferred stock minus the purchase of common and preferred stock, divided by total assets at the beginning
of the year. Net debt issues are calculated as long-term debt issues minus long-term debt reduction plus the
change in current debt, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.
FutureFinancing Financing, measured in the next fiscal year.
Guidance Number of management quarterly forecasts provided by the firm during the fiscal year.
HHI Indicator variable equaling 1 if the industry concentration measure based on Hoberg and Phillips (2016)
exceeds the median for the year, and 0 otherwise.
IndusLogPatentCite Average of LogPatentCite for firms in the same industry in a fiscal year.
IndusLogPatentCount Average of LogPatentCount for firms in the same industry in a fiscal year.
InstOwn Average percentage of shares outstanding held by all institutional investors within a fiscal year.
InstOwn50 Indicator variable equaling 1 if the percentage of shares outstanding collectively held by all institutional
investors is more than 50 percent for the year, and 0 otherwise.
Leverage Ratio of long- and short-term debt to total assets.
LagAmihud Amihud, measured in the previous fiscal year.
LagGuidance Guidance, measured in the previous fiscal year.
LagLTGuidance LTGuidance, measured in the previous fiscal year.
LagLogRetVol LogRetVol, measured in the previous fiscal year.
LagSTGuidance STGuidance, measured in the previous fiscal year.
LitigationRisk Litigation risk, measured following Kim and Skinner (2012).
LogAnalyst Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts following, measured in the middle of the last month of a
fiscal year.
LogPatentCite Natural logarithm of 1 plus the total number of citations received for all patents granted to a firm in a fiscal
year. The citation measure is adjusted for truncation, following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005). We use
the logarithmic citation count plus 1 to mitigate skewness in firm-level patents and citations. The data are
downloaded from the NBER patent database.
LogPatentCount Natural logarithm of 1 plus the total number of patent grants a firm obtains in a fiscal year. We use the
logarithm of the patent count plus 1 to mitigate skewness in the firm-level patent counts. The data are
downloaded from the NBER patent database.
LogSize Natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. The market value of equity is
measured in $millions.
LogVega Natural logarithm of 1 plus the vega. The vega is the dollar change in the value of the portfolio of the CEO’s
option holdings for a 1 percent change in the volatility of the stock returns.
LogDelta Natural logarithm of delta. The delta is the sensitivity of the executive’s stock and options portfolio to a 1
percent change in the stock price level.
LogRetVol Natural logarithm of the average daily return volatility in a fiscal year.
LogShrTurn Natural logarithm of the annual average of the daily trading volume divided by shares outstanding in a fiscal
year.
Loss Indicator variable equaling 1 if the net income before extraordinary items is negative, and 0 otherwise.
(continued on next page)
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APPENDIX A (continued)
Variable Name Definition
LTGuidance Number of quarterly guidance forecasts for fiscal quarters after the current fiscal quarter in the current fiscal
year.
MeanReturn Mean of the monthly returns during the fiscal year.
NumBizSeg Number of business segments, as disclosed by the firm under segment reporting.
PatentAttorney Total number of patent attorneys (and agents) within a state. The number of patent attorneys is obtained by
first downloading the directory of patent attorneys from the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) website (see: https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/) and then doing a count of how many there are in
each state.
PctFemDirector Percentage of female directors on the board.
PctIndDirector Percentage of independent directors on the board.
Post Indicator variable equaling 1 for the three-day window [t1, tþ1] after a patent grant, and 0 for the three-day
window [t4, t2] prior to the patent grant.
RetVol Standard deviation of the monthly returns during the fiscal year.
R&D Ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. If R&D is missing, the ratio is set to 0.
RegFD Indicator variable equaling 1 for the year 2001 and after, and 0 otherwise.
ROA Ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets.
ShrTurnover Annual average of the daily trading volume divided by shares outstanding in a fiscal year.
Spread Average daily bid-ask spread divided by the daily closing price in a fiscal year.
STAmihud Average daily absolute return divided by the daily dollar trading volume in a three-day window, multiplied by
1,000,000.
STGuidance Number of management quarterly guidance forecasts for the current fiscal quarter in the current fiscal year.
STLogRetVol Natural logarithm of the average daily return volatility in a three-day window.
Do Innovative Firms Communicate More? Evidence from the Relation between Patenting and Management Guidance 297
The Accounting Review
Volume 96, Number 1, 2021
